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Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?
MichaelSelmi"

I. INTRODUCTION

When the United States Supreme Court reverses a lower court and renders
a unanimous verdict for the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case, as it
did in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing,' you know that something is seriously
amiss. Reeves was not the first case in which the Court unanimously reversed a
lower court in order to correct an obviously flawed decision; indeed, in the
previous three years it had done so on four prior occasions. Surely no one would
accuse the current Supreme Court of being plaintiff-oriented in discrimination
cases, and the question I want to address in this essay is why have employment
discrimination cases become so hard to win? Why is it that courts continually
impose roadblocks for employment discrimination plaintiffs that do not exist for
other civil plaintiffs? The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was intended to address
judicial hostility to discrimination cases by expanding the statute's protection in
a number of areas and by substantially improving the remedies available under
Title VII. Yet, in the very first case the Supreme Court decided under the Act, it
sharply restricted the reach ofthe statute effectively delaying its introduction for
a number of years.3 In many ways, judicial hostility has gone unabated, though
much of that hostility is now felt in the lower courts rather than in the Supreme
Court, which today often acts as a surprising taming force on appellate courts.
As indicated by the Court's unanimity, Reeves, was not a difficult case.
Although several courts had found ambiguity in the Court's prior decision in St.
Mary'sHonor Centerv. Hicks,4 the Supreme Court clearly believed that its prior
Copyright 2001, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law Center. An earlier version of this
paper was presented at the Symposium on Employment Discrimination and the Problems ofProofheld
at Louisiana State University Law Center. I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in the
symposium and for the comments I received at that time, particularly those of the respondent Vice
*

Chancellor Gregory Vincent.
1. 530 U.S. 133,120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000) (unanimously reversing Fifth Circuit Court ofAppeals).
2. See Cleveland v. Policy Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999) (reversing Fifth
Circuit Court ofAppeals by holding that accepting disability payments does not automatically preclude
a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 117 S.
Ct. 843 (1997) (reversing Fourth Circuit Court ofAppeals by holding that applicants for employment
are covered by Title VII); Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 117 S.Ct. 660
(1997) (reversing Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the method by which employees are
counted forpurposes ofTitle Vlljurisdiction); O'Connorv. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S.
308, 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996) (reversing Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals by holding that an age
discrimination plaintiff can proceed with a claim even where the plaintiffwas replaced by someone who
is over 40 years old).
3. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994) (holding that the
damage provisions of the 1991 Civil Rights Act could not be applied retroactively).
4. 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2743 (1993). For cases interpreting Hicks to require some proof
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decision answered the question posed in Reeves, namely whether a plaintiff need
present evidence beyond pretext in order to prevail on a discrimination claim.
Quoting extensively from its decision in Hicks, the Court found that once a
plaintiff provides sufficient evidence to raise a credible question of pretext, the
issue becomes one for the jury and is not to be disturbed by a court except in the
extraordinary case. As the Court stated in Hicks, the factfinder "may, together
with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
''
discrimination," and that "no additional proof of discrimination is required.S
That said, the Fifth Circuit was not alone in requiring some direct evidence of
discrimination in order for a plaintiffto survive a summaryjudgment motion prior
to the Court's clarification in Reeves.6
Several reasons help explain why employment discrimination cases are so
difficult to win. First, a general misperception, one that has been fueled by the
popular anti-employment discrimination rhetoric often financed by conservative
interest groups, strongly influences courts' perception of the cases. This general
misperception is that employment cases are easy-not difficult-to win, and the
volume ofemployment discrimination cases is said to reflect an excessive amount
of costly nuisance suits. This perception is reflected in one of the more ironic
statements ever to be uttered by a federal judge, when Judge Frank Easterbrook
ofthe Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals wryly noted that plaintiffs cannot win all
close cases." Fair enough, but one might respond, how about just a few? As I will
discuss below, employment discrimination cases are notoriously difficult-not
easy-to win.
In addition to the general misperception regarding the success of
discrimination claims, courts are also affected by various biases that help explain
their treatment of employment discrimination cases. As discussed below, those
biases differ depending on the nature of the claim; for example, with respect to
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), courts seem quite concerned about
the potential breadth of the statute-not a totally unfounded concern-and have,
therefore, trimmed its scope as a way of ferreting out some of the more
extravagant claims, but in the process have excluded many claims that were
clearly intended to fall within the statute's ambit. When it comes to race cases,
which are generally the most difficult claim for a plaintiff to succeed on, courts
often seem mired in a belief that the claims are generally unmeritorious, brought
by whining plaintiffs who have been given too many, not too few, breaks along
the way. These biases, as well as others, inevitably influence courts' treatment
beyond pretext for aplaintiff to succeed on aclaim see Fisher v.Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d
Cir. 1997) (en banc); Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies, 120 F.3d 328 (1st Cir. 1997);
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
5. 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 (emphasis in original and citations omitted).
6. Fisher v.Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc); Hidalgo v. Overseas
Condado Ins. Agencies, 120 F.3d 328 (Ist Cir. 1997); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc).
7. Lever v. Northwestern Univ., 979 F.2d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 1992) ("No rule of law says that

employees win all close cases.").
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of discrimination cases, and help explain why the cases are so difficult to win.
Furthermore, as discussed below, these biases can be extremely difficult to

overcome.
This essay will proceed in three parts. First, I will establish that employment
discrimination cases are unusually difficult to prove, and then I will discuss how
judicial bias influences courts' treatment of discrimination claims. In the last
part, I will explore whether this bias can be contermanded or whether it might be
an entrenched part of our judicial system. I should note that in this essay I am
going to make some rather broad claims that will not necessarily be supported by
the bevy ofcitations that are often typical of law review writing, but it is my hope
here to ask and explore questions rather than to resolve them in any definitive
way.
II.

THE REAL STATISTICAL STORY

There is it seems a general consensus that employment discrimination cases
are too easy to file, and all too easy to win. This sentiment is doubtlessly, at least
in part, fueled by the spate of popular books decrying the damage done by
employment suits, as well as the relentless efforts by well-financed lobbying and
philanthropical groups with a conscious aim to limit the reach of the
antidiscrimination laws.8 But this picture is grossly distorted, and while there are
large numbers of employment discrimination suits-and I have suggested that
such claims are generally too easy to file with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission--these suits are far too difficult, rather than easy, to win.
Each year about 100,000 employment discrimination claims are filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and about 20,000 cases are filed in
8. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds (1992); Philip K. Howard, The Death of
Common Sense (1994); Walter K. Olson, The Excuse Factory: How Employment Law is Paralyzing
the American Workplace (1997). There have also been a large number ofbooks challenging the notion
that discrimination remains an important part ofcontemporary society that have sold remarkably well
and which were often financed by private conservative research groups. The best known ofthese is
Richard J. Hernstein &Charles Murray's The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American
Life (1994) a book that became a best-seller despite its obvious and exposed flaws. Shelby Steele, then
an English Professor at the relatively unknown San Jose State University, gained national attention and
best-seller status with his book The Content of Our Character: A New Vision of Race in America
(1991), and linguist John McWhorter has likewise achieved much acclaim for his book Losing the
Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America (2000). Ironically, despite their message, the primary credential
Professors Steele and McWhorter brought to their work was their race; although both are African
Americans, neither had previously written on race, andneither concentrated on race in their professional
disciplines. All ofthese books, however, have sold much better than their liberal counterparts, with the
possible exception ofAndrew Hacker's book entitled Two Nations, published in 1991. The role of
conservative philanthropical groups is evident in these works: Shelby Steele is now a Professor at the
conservative Hoover Institution, Walter Olson works out of the conservative Manhattan Institute, as
does Abigail Thernstrom who published along with her husband Stephan Thermstrom the influential
America in Black & White: One Nation, Indivisible (1997), which is a rosy-colored portrait ofrace
relations in America wrapped around an anti-affirmative action message.
9. See Michael Selmi, The Value ofthe EEOC: ReexaminingtheAgency's Rolein Employment
Discrimination Law, 57 Ohio St. LJ. 1 (1996).
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federal court. These numbers have increased significantly during the last
decade due to expansion of important antidiscrimination laws. Passed in
1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act now accounts for nearly a
quarter of discrimination claims filed in any given year, and the 1991
Amendments to Title VII created additional incentives for plaintiffs to
bring claims. These changes have resulted in a three-fold increase in
federal court filings during the last decade," and employment
discrimination cases now account for just under ten percent of the cases
filed in federal court." One interesting and perhaps noteworthy aspect of the
filings is that they have increased during the late 1990s despite an extremely
strong economy with the lowest post-World War II level of unemployment on
record.
As has been well documented, plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits
generally fare worse than most other kinds of civil plaintiffs. Only about fifteen
percent ofthe claims filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
result in some relief being provided to plaintiffs, a percentage that tends to fall
below other administrative claims." In federal courts, plaintiffs have long
suffered success rates that fall below other civil plaintiffs, and it does not appear
that this trend has been reversed or even modified by the infusion of judges
appointed by President Clinton, most of whom had little background in
employment discrimination and those who did were more likely to have
represented corporate defendants than individual plaintiffs. 3 Indeed, the Clinton
Administration's record on enforcement of employment discrimination statutes
generally compares unfavorably to his Republican predecessors, indicated, in
part, by the decline in case filings-by nearly one-third-from those instituted by
the Administration of George Bush, Sr.' 4

10. In 1990, for example, 6,936 employment discrimination cases were filed in federal court,
whereas by 1998 the numbers had increased to 21,540, roughly equivalent to the number ofcases filed
in the two previous years. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil Rights Complaints in U.S. District
Courts, 1990-98, at 4 Table 3 (Jan. 2000).
11. In 1998, there were 256,787 cases filed in federal court. Id. at 2, Table 1.
12. See Selmi, supra note 9, at 13. The numbers vary by year, ranging during the period 199299 from ahigh of 16.5 percent of claimants obtained some relief from the process in 1999, to a low of
9.1 percent in 1996. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Charge Data on All Statutes,
FY 1992-FY 1999.
13. In its 1998 Annual Report on Judicial Selection, the Alliance for Justice commented, "In an
effort to nominate 'safe' individuals who would be easily confirmed by the partisan Senate, President
Clinton appointed moderate judges and few nominees with any public interest background." Alliance
for Justice, Judicial Selection Project Annual Report 1998, at 3. For example, "only one judge
confirmed in 1998 had experience working full-time in apublic interest law organization." Id. at 8.
14. In 1990 and 1991, there were more than 600 cases filed in which the United States was a
plaintiff,whereas during the rest of the 90s the case filings tended to hover around 400 cases, with a
high of497 in 1993 and a low of 289 in 1996. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 10, at 4,
Table 4. See also Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement ofCivil Rights: The Case ofHousing
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1401, 1427-35 (1998).
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Table One
Case Dispositions 1995-1997
Jobs

N
Pretrial Motions
Other Dismis.
Jury Verd.
Non-Jury V.
Other
Total

8,241
34,708
2,074
655
4,017
49,695

%
.1585
.6677
.0398
.0126
.0772
.9558

Insurance
N
%
3,011
.1298
15,285
.6591
435
.0187
268
.0115
3,456
.1490
22,455
.9681

Personal
N
2,504
16,941
1,301
84
4,493
25,323

Injury
%
.0944
.6387
.0490
.0031
.1694
.9546

Source: Administrative Office ofthe Courts

The difficulty plaintiffs have in federal court can perhaps best be
measured by their success rates, particularly when compared to other cases.
Tables One and Two are derived from data compiled by the Administrative
Office of the Courts and maintained in an accessible database by Cornell
Law School." Table One provides asummary of the various ways in which
cases are disposed of in federal court for three different claims as
classified by the Administrative Office of the Courts: jobs (the category
for employment cases), insurance claims and personal injury claims.' There
are more than two times as many employment claims as either insurance
or personal injury. However, the most noteworthy statistic is that the
methods of case dispositions are roughly the same across categories, with
a slightly higher percentage (15.85 percent) of employment cases being
resolved through pretrial motions than is true for either insurance (12.98
percent) or personal injury cases (9.4 percent). 7

15. The database can be accessed at http://teddy.law.comell.edu:8090/questata.htm.
16. These categories were chosen primarily because they included sizable numbers ofcases and
were roughly comparable in their substance to provide a reasonable basis for comparison. Ialso sought
to compare medical malpractice cases, which have a trial success rate that is more comparable to
employment discrimination cases, but the database included relatively few medical malpractice cases
since most are filed in state court. For employment discrimination cases, Iincluded only those cases
where the jurisdiction was based on a federal question, to screen out employment cases premised on a
diversity basis that may not involve discrimination issues, whereas for insurance and personal injury
cases Irelied on thejurisdictional category "all bases."
17. There are also fewer cases defined as "other" among the employment cases, which suggests
that the employment cases offer amore complete picture of the set ofcases disposed of in federal court.
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Table Two
Plaintiff Success Rates 1995-1997
Jobs
N

Pretrial Motions
Jury Verd.
Non-Jury V.
Directed V.
Total

18,133
11,992
10,637
1,163
12,229

Insurance
%

.021
.399
.187
.043
.089

N

2,896
423
250
27
3,596

_

.340
.513
.436
.259
.367

Personal Injury
N

%

2,457
1,268
328
84
4,137

.051
.408
.418
.107
.191

Source: Administrative Office of the Courts

Table Two provides the plaintiff's success rates based on the total number of
cases disposed of, and here some interesting differences appear. Of the cases
disposed ofby pretrial motion, nearly ninety-eight percent ofthem were decided in
favor of defendants, compared to ninety-five percent ofpersonal injury cases and
sixty-six percent ofinsurance cases. These statistics do not measure the number of
motions that were denied, but it is striking that such a large number of cases are
summarily disposed ofin favor ofdefendants. Plaintiffs also have a slightly lower
success rate at trial during this period (39.9 percent), certainly when measured
against the success rates ofinsurance cases (51.3 percent) which closely relates to
the prevailing success rates for other civil claims, where studies indicate that
defendants tend to succeed in approximately fifty percent of the claims that are
resolved. is

More significantly, both as a point of comparison and for the purposes ofmy
argument, is the success rate for cases tried before a judge. Plaintiffs in
employment cases succeeded on only 18.7 percent ofthe cases tried before ajudge,
whereas the success rates for plaintiffs in judge-tried insurance cases was 43.6
percent and 41.8 percent for personal injury cases. Plaintiffs are thus half as
successful when their cases are tried before a judge than a jury, and success rates

18. See, e.g., Bureau ofJustice Statistics, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996
at I (Sept. 1999) ("Overall, plaintiffs won in 52 percent of trial cases."); Bureau ofJustice Statistics,
Civil Jury Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992 (plaintiffs
won 52 percent ofcases surveyed). The 50 percent success rate is consistent with what is known as the
Priest-Kljen hypothesis, which predicted that close cases are most likely to go to trial and because of
that selection the cases were likely to split evenly among defendants and plaintiffs. See George L. Priest
&Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputesforLitigation, 13 J.Legal Stud. 1(1984). It should be
noted that success rates vary by the nature of the case. For two recent discussions ofsuccess rates and
surveys ofsome of the past studies see Leandra Lederman, Which CasesGo to Trial?: An Empirical
Study of PredictorsofFailureto Settle, 49 Case W. Res. 315, 322-24 (1999); Daniel Kessler et al.,
Explaining Deviationsfrom the Fifty Percent Rule: AMultimodel Appraoch to the Selection ofCases
for Litigation, 25 J.Legal Stud. 233, 236-42 (1996).
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are more than fifty percent below the rate ofother claims. 9 As Ted Eisenberg has
documented, employment discrimination plaintiffs have long had difficulty with
trials before a judge; indeed, only claims filed by prisoners tend to have a lower
success rate.2°
Two recent studies have likewise documented the extreme difficulty plaintiffs
have had in prevailing on disability claims. Based on a review ofreported decisions
published between 1992-98, Ruth Colker found that defendants prevailed in more
than ninety-three percent of the cases decided on the merits at the trial court level,

and in eighty-four percent ofthe cases that were subsequently appealed.2 Professor

Colker also found some evidence to suggest a higher reversal rate on plaintiff
victories. While defendants' sustained eighty-four percent of their trial victories,
plaintiffs' victories were affirmed in only fifty-two percent ofthe cases.22 In a study
of 760 cases that involved a prevailing party, the American Bar Association found
that the defendants prevailed in ninety-two percent of the claims. '
Accordingly, the statistical picture diverges from the common wisdom. In fact,
there is very little evidence to suggest that employment cases provide a windfall for
plaintiffs. It seems clear that courts are hostile to employment discrimination cases,

and I think the reason has to do not just with the perception that the cases are too
easy to bring but also that most are lacking merit. Indeed, the bias courts bring to
their adjudicative process likely influences the general misperception that cases are
easy to win, and these two issues are inevitably closely linked.
III. THE BIAS COURTS BRING TO CASES
The primary reason discrimination cases are so hard to prove has to do with the
bias courts bring to their analyses. By the term bias I do not mean that courts hold
or express animus toward discrimination cases, though some courts undoubtedly do,
but instead I mean that courts approach cases from a particular perspective that
reflects a bias against the claims. I should be clear that here I amtreating courts not
as anonymous or reasoned institutions but as the people they are, and as people,
they are unlikely to always be able to shed themselves of their biases. In the last
few years, an extensive literature has developed regarding the ways in which bias
may stem from unconscious forces to explain how discrimination continues to affect
the workplace and why employers might be affected by these biases despite their

19. 1have not sought to determine whether these differences are statistically significant since I
have not had direct access to the database and do not want to imply greater confidence in the results
than might be warranted.by providing a measure ofconfidence, and have opted instead to focus on the

relative percentages.
20. SeeTheodore Eisenberg, LitigationModelsand TrialOutcomesin CivilRightsandPrisoner
Cases, 77 Geo. L.J. 1567 (1989).
21. See Ruth Colker, TheAmericans With DisabilitiesAct: A Windfallfor Defendants,34 Harv.
C.R.- C.L. Rev. 99, 100 (1999).
22. Id. at 108.
23. See Study FindsEmployers Win Most ADA Title IJudicialandAdministrative Complaints,
22 Mental & Physical Disabling L Rep. 403 (1998).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

best efforts.'
This literature, however, has focused almost exclusively on
employers and individual actors. In this essay Iwant to extend that analysis to the
courts, for although some courts are able to separate themselves from their own
personal perspectives, most courts are not, and those biases strongly influence how
courts decide particular cases especially in the discrimination context.2" At the
same time, it is important to note that not all the bias I will discuss stems from
unconscious forces, but rather although it may be manifested in subtle ways, it often
arises from conscious beliefs-the kind ofbeliefs someone might admit at a party
after having one too many drinks but that is otherwise suppressed because it falls
outside what is seen as the mainstream even though it, in fact, may mirror the norm.
The bias the courts bring to the cases varies by the type of case. It is now
liberal gospel to deride all discrimination in equal terms, to suggest that no
discrimination is permissible, and all reprehensible, and with some exceptions the
various federal statutes tend to treat most discrimination in like terms. This has also
been true of federal enforcement agencies, which have generally declined to
prioritize discrimination claims but instead treat all claims as equally worthy. This
is, ofcourse, not true with respect to the Constitution. The Supreme Court has long
adhered to tiers of scrutiny to distinguish kinds of discrimination based on their
origin. Indeed, rather than treating all discrimination alike, it seems significantly
more helpful to distinguish among kinds of discrimination, stressing in particular
that the bias courts bring to the cases can vary by the nature ofthe case.
A. Race Discrimination Claims

Race discrimination claims are generally thought to be the most difficult
employment claim to succeed on, and when it comes to race, the courts' bias tends
toward our common definition of bias. Much has been written about the way in
which subtle and unconscious beliefs can influence one's interpretation when race
is involved, and it seems that courts tend to view the claims of race plaintiffs
skeptically, in a way that lends credence to some of the contentions ofaffirmative
action critics who argue that affirmative action can.broadly taint the actions of the
affected group. To be sure, affirmative action has negative side effects and whether
those side effects are worth the benefits is an issue well beyond the scope of this
essay. But the point I want to make here is that courts often analyze race cases from
an anti-affirmative action mindset, one that views both the persistence of
discrimination and the merits of the underlying claims with deep skepticism.
Indeed, this was true even of Justice Powell's famous opinion in Regents of
24. On the nature of unconscious discrimination in the employment setting see, for example,
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination in Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995); Amy L. Wax,
Discrimination as Accident, 74 Ind. LJ. 1129 (1999); Virginia Valian, Why So Slow? The
Advancement of Women (1999).
25. This has long been the message of the legal realists and critical legal studies scholars. For
arecent work along these lines that concludes that we should remove many constitutional issues from
the courts' jurisdiction see Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999).
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California v. Bakke, which appears to have been influenced by a number of
scholarly critiques of affrmiative action programs,26 and is likewise true of Justice
O'Connor's influential opinions on race discrimination which are steeped in a belief
that many observed racial disparities represent the natural order of things.27
This bias is, more than anything else, a way of seeing things, a way of
analyzing evidence, drawing inferences and conclusions based on ambiguous or
contested evidence. As I have argued previously, our assumptions about the
world-about the prevalence of discrimination and its role in explaining
events-deeply influences the way in which we identify the causation that is central
to establishing a discrimination claim.2 Moreover, it seems that the general
consensus today is that the role discrimination plays in contemporary America has
been sharply diminished, and those who take this view are reluctant to fird
discrimination absent compelling evidence. As a result, courts appear hesitant to
draw inferences of racial discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, even
though courts have long recognized that race discrimination is generally subtle in
form and dependent on circumstantial evidence.29
This mindset was evident in the various legal interpretations entwined in St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, a case that required drawing inferences from
circumstantial evidence that necessitated interpretation.30 In that case, Melvin
Hicks, who was the only African American supervisor on staff,was disciplined and
ultimately fired after several confrontations with his boss, who was white. As the
trial court found, Hicks was disciplined for infractions of his subordinates contrary
to common practice, and Hicks was also singled out following a change in
management. The new management wanted to reassert control ofthe prison facility
in response to a report suggesting that having too many African-American
supervisors might have had a deleterious affect on discipline among the inmates, a
majority of whom were African-American. 3'
Despite its finding that the
26. In particular, Justice Powell seems to have been influenced by the work ofnow Judge Richard
Posner and Willian Van Alstyne, two prominent early critics of affirmative action. I discuss these
themes in Michael Selmi, Remedying Societal Discrimination Through the Government's Spending
Power (2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). For an interesting explanation ofthe
influence ofJudge Posner and interest group political theory on Justice Powell, see Keith J. Bybee, The
Political Sign ifcance ofLegal Ambiguity: The Case ofAffirmative Action, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 263

(2000).
27. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.J. 279, 281-82 (1997).
28. See id.
29. The Supreme Court noted the importance of eradicating subtle discrimination as early as
1969, in an important voting rights case interpreting the mandate of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
See Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565, 89 S. Ct. 817, 831 (1969) (noting that section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act was "aimed at subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations.
30. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2743 (1993).
31. This latter fact, which seems potentially quite relevant, was never mentioned in the Supreme
Court opinions, but was noted in a footnote by the Court of Appeals. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor
Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 490 n.6 (8th Cir. 1992). The Court ofAppeals explained:
Plaintiff also introduced evidence at trial of a study performed in 1980 and 1981 of two
honor centers in St. Louis and Kansas City. According to the district court's findings,
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employer's proffered reasons were pretextual, the district court found that the
underlying rationale was personal animus between Hicks and his supervisors, rather
than racial animus. Surely the evidence could have been interpreted to find that the
source ofthe personal bias was racial animosity, conscious or otherwise, though this
possibility never seems to have been explored by the district court. 2 It was,
however, expressly mentioned by Justice Souter in dissent, suggesting that a
differentjudge, working through a different mindset, one where discrimination may
be more readily accepted as an explanation, would have interpreted the evidence
differently.33
B. Age DiscriminationClaims
Age discrimination cases present an interesting but quite different puzzle. They
tend to fare the best in court,34 particularly before juries that can sympathize with
the plaintiffs given that all jurors are likely to become old. Depending on the
circumstances, age discrimination plaintiffs might also be sympathetic due to their
employment successes, as many plaintiffs have established themselves, were making
healthy salaries, and were terminated in part to rid the company ofthe high salary. 3
Not only are jurors likely to get old, but they may also aspire to the success these
plaintiffs have achieved and feel particularly disgruntled when the plaintiffhas been
coldly turned out after many years of success. Given the age of many judges, and
their life-tenure, one might expect courts to sympathize with the plaintiffs in a
similar manner, though a number of other factors work to counter this potential

sympathy.
One important factor explaining the courts' reluctance to offer broad
protections is the very breadth of the statute, which applies to anyone who is forty
years old or over, a wide swath and many would argue that what we might define
as discrimination based on age is not likely to be particularly prominent until a later
age, perhaps at age fifty. There are a surprising number of plaintiffs who have
recently celebrated their fortieth birthday and courts are quite skeptical of their

this study concluded that "too many blacks were in positions ofpower at St. Mary's, and
that the potential for subversion of the superintendent's power, if the staff became
racially polarized, was very real." However, none of the witnesses for the defense
admitted to being aware of the study at the time of the 1984 personnel changes at St.
Mary's.
Id. (citation omitted).
32. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1251-52 (E.D. Mo. 1991). Indeed,
the District Court Judge, who incidentally was Rush Limbaugh's uncle, went to great lengths to dispute
all of the evidence Hicks had introduced.
33. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 542, 113 S. Ct. at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that in
identifying personal animosity as a possible explanation, the district court "failed to recognize [that it]
might be racially motivated").
34. See George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment
DiscriminationLaw, 24 J.Legal Stud. 491 (1995).
35. Id. at 493 (documenting that among discrimination plaintiffs, age discrimination plaintiffs
had incomes nearly twice as high as others).
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claims, presumably based on the assumption that a forty-year-old is not likely to be
the subject of discrimination. Moreover, given the breadth of the statute, it is quite
easy to establish a prima facie case that will enable the plaintiff to proceed on her
claim, and yet it is a prima facie case that does not hold the same evidentiary value
as a case premised on race or gender. Indeed, this is one area where treating all
discrimination cases equally can lead to a doctrinal mismatch; age cases have
largely borrowed the proof structure from Title VII, even though the prima facie
case in an age discrimination case is likely to offer less probative value than is true
in a race discrimination case because of the different histories our country has
experienced with respect to race and age discrimination.
As is too often overlooked, the prima facie case in employment discrimination
cases makes sense only to the extent that a reasonable inference can be drawn from
the established facts. In the case ofrace discrimination, it seems reasonable to draw
an inference of discrimination based solely on the prima facie case because the most
common neutral reasons for employment decisions have been introduced into the
deliberation-qualifications, availability and race.36 Establishing a prima facie case
effectively eliminates two neutral reasons, the plaintiffs qualifications and the
availability of a position, while introducing a discriminatory reason into the legal
equation as a third possibility. This presumption, however, turns on the prevalence
of race discrimination as a common explanation for an employer's decisions,
something on which at the time the test was developed there seemed to exist a
national consensus. 7
But there has never been the same kind of consensus with respect to age
discrimination. While employers undoubtedly take age into account, many contend
that age-based decisions are often rational and relevant in a manner that would not
be true for race. As has been well documented and widely accepted in the field of
economics, an individual's productivity declines over time while his salary tends to
increase in a disproportionate manner largely because of the entrenched senioritybased salary system that continues to dominate most sectors ofour economy, as well
as underpayment in the early years of a career while employees settle into more
permanent positions.3 Unlike decisions based on race, age-based decisions are not
always discriminatory in nature. The lack of a consensus with respect to age
discrimination is reflected in the continuing debate over mandatory retirement, as
well as the reluctance by several courts to permit adverse impact claims under the
ADEA even though they are specifically permitted under both Title VII and the
ADA. 39
36. I discuss this rationale for the prima facie case in Selmi, supra note 27, at 324-28.
37. Id. at 326-28.
38. The argument was originally articulated by Professor Edward Lazear, and is typically
discussed in standard labor economics textbooks. See, e.g., Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Robert S. Smith,
Modem Labor Economics 398-402 (6th ed. 1997); Edward Lazear, Why Is There Mandatory
Retirement?, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1261 (1979). Two works of legal scholars discussing the nature ofage
discrimination are Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accomodating Just Cause and Employment
at Will, 92 Mich. L Rev. 8 (1993) and Samuel Issacharoff& Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination
Really Age Discrimination? The ADEA 's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L Rev. 780 (1997).
39. Compare Katz v. Regents of the Univ., 229 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2000) (allowing disparate
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As a result, age discrimination cases present a difficult scenario for courts, as
they represent a class to which juries are likely to be sympathetic despite the often
tenuous theory that underlies the cause of action. Courts have thus been inclined
to craft rules that facilitate granting summary judgment against age discrimination
plaintiffs, for example, requiring direct evidence in some cases as a way ofkeeping
cases away from juries. Indeed, this is how many of the pretext-plus cases arose,
and, in this respect, it is worth noting that Reeves itself was an age discrimination
claim.
C. The Americans with DisabilitiesAct
Courts' concerns regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act parallel in
many important ways the age discrimination cases. Here, though, the problem is
largely with the scope ofthe statute, which has engendered a large number ofclaims
that could not have been contemplated by its legislative advocates. The ADA,
which passed with overwhelming congressional support, defined the critical term
"disabled" in a purposefully vague manner. As a result, many individuals who
would not be classified as disabled but for the potentially broad statutory reach have
pursued claims under the statute. This includes, as a partial and almost random list:
smokers, nonsmokers,40 those who have reactions to various chemicals including
perfume, 4' those who are afraid ofsnakes42 or who are rude,43 and individuals who
wear glasses." Although these claims are not always frivolous-and some severe
cases may present difficulties that could rise to the level of a disability-they are
almost all destined for defeat. Indeed, for the most part, none ofthe claims that has

impact cause ofaction) with Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 703 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that
ADEA does not provide cause of action for disparate impact).
40. Leonard v. Rolette County, No. 99-2130, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29732 (8th Cir. Nov. 12,
1999) (per curiam); Charla Keck v. New York State Office of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs.,
10 F. Supp.2d 194 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (alleging allergies to tobacco and perfume); Patricia Homeyer v.
Stanley Tulchin Assocs., No. 95 C 4439, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17114 (N.D. II. Nov. 17, 1995)
(alleging sensitivity to smoking).
41. See Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (alleging
environmental sensitivity including to perfume); Boren v. Wolverine Tube, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 457 (N.D.
Miss. 1997) (allergic reaction to achemical in the workplace); Comber v. Prologue, Inc., No. JFM-992637, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16331 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2000) (among other ailments, alleged chemical
sensitivity).
42. See Anderson v. North Dakota State Hosp., 232 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2000).
43. See Crandall v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 146 F.3d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
44. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
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arisen on the outer perimeter of the statute has succeeded,45 yet in trimming the
perimeter, courts are reaching the core.
This is nowhere more apparent than in the Supreme Court's recent trilogy of
cases involving whether mitigating measures should be taken into account when
46
assessing whether a person is disabled under the terms of the statute. In the
leading case, Sutton v. UnitedAirlines, Inc., the plaintiffs were twin sisters who
wore corrective lenses, a fact that prevented them from becoming commercial
airline pilots, relegating them instead to flying with regional air carriers.47 Although
the plaintiffs' vision was seriously deficient and far worse than most people who
wear glasses, this case was a certain loser in the Supreme Court. To my mind, it is
inconceivable that the Supreme Court would find that those who wear glasses are
disabled, even with the possibility ofsome limiting principle based on the severity
of the vision loss.4" The Court's ruling, however, threatens what most would
consider core ADA claims--claims nearly everyone would classify as involving
disabilities. Following Sutton, a number ofcourts have found that individuals with
epilepsy or diabetes do not qualify as disabled, as well as plaintiffs who suffer from
depression that is susceptible to drug treatment.49

It may be that these claims on the statute's outer perimeter represent a natural
evolution ofa new and innovative statute that left much room for interpretation. At
the same time, one has to wonder what good has arisen from the pursuit of claims
where courts are unlikely to be sympathetic, such as the chemical sensitivity claims
which have no scientific ormedical support and lend themselves to malingering and
disgruntled employees. Rather, in their predictable effort to rid the judicial system

45. For example, the chemical sensitivity claims, which originated under the Fair Housing Act
Amendments of 1988, have been uniformly unsuccessful. See Comber v. Prologue, Inc., No. JFM-992637, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16331 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2000) (granting summary judgment for
defendant on disability claims including chemical sensitivity syndrome); Keck v. New York State
Office ofAlcoholism and Substance Abuse Servs., 10 F. Supp.2d 194 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that
plaintiff had stated a claim with respect to perfume allergy but granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment); Boren v. Wolverine Tube, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (granting
summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's claim to allergic chemical reaction); Whillock v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (granting defendant's summary judgment motion
on environmental chemical sensitivity claim).
46. See Murphy v. United Parcel Service., 527 U.S. 516, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527
U.S. 555, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
47. Sutton, 527 U.S. at471, 119S. Ct. at 2139.
48. The Court's decision, which relies on prefatory information in the legislative history and
ranks as one of their more unpersuasive employment decisions, supports the notion that the Court was
destined to rule against the plaintiffs.
49. See, e.g., Krocka v. City ofChicago, 203 F.3d 507 (7th Cir.2000) (finding that police officer
who suffered from severe depression treatable through medication was not disabled); Epstein v. KalvinMiller Int'l Inc., 100 F. Supp.2d 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (diabetes not a covered disability because
treatable); Arnold v. City of Appleton, 97 F. Supp.2d 937 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (epilepsy not covered
disability); Eibest v. Planned Parenthood, 94 F. Supp.2d 873 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (Epstein-Barr disease
did not cause substantial limitation in light of Sutton).

LOUISIANA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 61

of fringe claims, courts have just as predictably signed a death warrant for claims
that soundly deserve judicial recognition.
Each of these three statutes present different circumstances for the courts.
When it comes to race discrimination, courts appear skeptical of the legitimacy of
the claim, which also influences their determinations on age discrimination though
in a different light, whereas on disabilities claims the courts' primary concern has
to do with the volume of cases, a volume that includes a large number ofclaims for
nontraditional disabilities. In some ways the skepticism the courts bring to these
cases reflect overlapping issues: in each the court is often reluctant to see
discrimination as the underlying cause either because of a belief that the plaintiff is
not truly disabled and therefore not subject to discrimination or because the plaintiff
has not truly suffered discrimination, as seems true in both the context of race and
age cases.
D. GenderDiscriminationCases
Gender cases present a more complicated picture, one that is strongly
influenced by reigning stereotypes that seem to die all too hard. Despite the fact
that two-income families now comprise the majority of American families, as a
society we remain ambivalent over the role ofworking women. While there is a
begrudging acceptance of the economic need for women to work, there remains a
strong desire to return to the days when women were predominantly occupied with
their work in the home, a fact that is repeatedly reflected in public opinion polls.'
Although I have not done an empirical inquiry to verify the fact,it is quite possible
that a majority ofjudges have nonworking wives, given their age and status both of
which would likely lead to a disproportionate number of nonworking spouses."'
The influence ofthese stereotypes and mindsets will work in subtle ways, and
have likely precluded various litigation strategies aimed at challenging the structure
ofthe traditional workplace, where women have sought to work part-time, or sought
time to breastfeed their children at work, or complained of a glass ceiling or who
advocated for comparable worth, all claims that have generally failed to obtain
redress in the courts.52 Courts are also often influenced by what they might consider
the proper roles for women regarding the evidence they admit, or how the evidence
might be interpreted, often viewing as unproblematic employer explanations that
may be steeped in women's interests in particular positions.53
50.

A 1998 poll conducted by the Washington Post found that 40 percent ofrespondents would

like to return to the gender roles of the 1950s. See Richard Morin & Megan Rosenfeld, With More
Equity, More Sweat, The Washington Post, Mar. 22, 1998, at Al.
51. At the end of 1999, 80 percent of the federal judges were men. See Alliance for Justice,
Judicial Selection Process Annual Report 1999, at 15.
52. See Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What To Do
About It (2000) (discussing the limitations ofexisting doctrine).

53.

The most famous case along these lines is the failed litigation against Sears Roebuck, where

very few women found their way into commission jobs. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &Co., 839 F.2d
302 (7th Cir. 1988). A more recent example was found in the District Court opinion exonerating the
venerable restaurant Joe's Stone Crab which did not hire women to work on the dining room waitstaff.
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Courts, including the Supreme Court, vary considerably in how receptive they
have been to women's claims ofsexual harassment. After unanimously creating a
fairly protective standard for establishing hostile environment claims,S' the Supreme
Court recently crafted an affirmative defense that provides employers some
immunity from liability in cases where the plaintiff's workplace conditions are not
tangibly affected by the harassment.55 It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court
created the affrmnative defense out ofwhole cloth, as there was very little precedent
for the defense, and the Court appeared to do so as a way of offering employers
some protection from liability. It is too early to tell what the effect of these
decisions will be. It is indeed possible that their effect will be fairly limited given
that they only apply in circumstances where the employer has instituted an effective
policy intended to address sexual harassment and where the plaintiff's workplace
conditions were not adversely affected.' At the same time, the cases may signal a
shift in judicial attitudes that portends more difficulty for plaintiffs to recover in
cases ofsexual harassment, contrary to the explicit intent ofthe 1991 amendments

to Title VII, which were in large measure intended to rectify the lack of remedies
available to many victims of sexual harassment under prior law.
E. A NeutralExplanation
I have been concentrating on the bias courts bring to cases as a way of
explaining why discrimination cases are so difficult to win, but there may be a less
pernicious cause at work. It may be that employment discrimination cases have
low success rates because there are many frivolous or marginal claims among the

thousands of claims filed in any given year. As noted earlier, it is indeed a bit
curious that the number of cases filed has not significantly decreased over the
course of the last five years even though the labor market has been exceptionally
tight and the economy strong, two facts that should restrain employers'
discriminatory impulses.
Yet, upon reflection, it appears that there is very little reason to believe that
employment discrimination cases are any less meritorious as a class than other types
of civil claims. Although it is relatively easy to file a claim, and this ease likely
explains a substantial portion ofthe cases that are filed with the EEOC, there is no
obvious reason why employment cases would be singled out for an unusually high
volume ofweak claims. The vast majority ofemployment discrimination cases are
filed by an attorney, rather than by a pro se plaintiff, and attorneys are generally
motivated by the profit potential of their cases. Some attorneys are undoubtedly
more interested in cause litigation than they are in the financial aspects ofthe cases,
but these attorneys comprise a small subgroup and among them there is again no
The decision was reversed on appeal. See EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, 220 F.3d 1263 (11 th Cir. 2000).
54. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) and Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993).
55. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998); Burlington Indus. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
56. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. at 2270.
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particular reason why they would tend to select frivolous cases. They may, on the
other hand, pursue difficult but important cases, and it is certainly possible, though
unlikely, that these cases contribute to the excessive volume.
For those attorneys who are in the pursuit of profit, employment discrimination
cases seem an especially poor choice to emphasize, since the claims are exceedingly
difficult to win and offer the potential for limited damages, two factors that should
suppress rather than encourage filings. Employment discrimination cases remain one
of the few classes of cases where the damages are capped, with a maximum recovery
of $300,000 available to eachplaintiff, although the average recovery tends to fall well
short ofthe cap." Moreover, as noted previously, there are few kinds ofcases that are
more difficult to win than employment discrimination claims, and the combination of
relatively low damages and a low success rate should restrain rather than encourage
profit-seeking attorneys. It may be that the prospect of securing attorney's fees adds
an attractive inducement to bring claims, but this should only be true for the strong
rather than weak claims given that fees are only available to a successful plaintiff.
Moreover, attorney's fees have always been available for discrimination plaintiffs and
the surge in cases that has occurred in the 1990s after the passage ofthe ADA and the
amendments to Title VII suggests that the availability of fees is not the cause of the
dramatic increase in case filings. Another possibility is that the prospect of damage
recovery has made these cases easier to settle, a fact that by itself may encourage
claims. However, the data do not indicate a significant increase in settlements after
the statutory changes that took effect in the early 1990s.5"
Another possibility that may offer some explanation is that attorneys bring
employment discrimination cases based on less information than they might have for
other kinds of claims. The investigative files of the EEOC are not available to
plaintiffs, and in many cases, the attorney will only have the word of the plaintiffprior
to filing a claim. Employers often do not provide reasons for their employment
decisions, and even when reasons are given, the particular employee may not have
access to the comparative information that would enable the attorney to accurately
assess the merits of the claim. As a result, informational asymmetries may result in
excessive filings because the attorneys may require discovery before being able to
fully evaluate the case. These asymmetries may distinguish employment
discrimination claims from other kinds of civil cases where witnesses or documents
may be more readily available to the plaintiffs prior to discovery. However, if this
were the case, there should be a higher number of voluntary dismissals among
employment discrimination cases, and based on the data collected in Table One, there
is no significant difference among the voluntary dismissal rates for the three categories
of cases.
57. For example, according to the Administrative Office of the Courts data, the median jury
award in an employment discrimination suit during 1997 was $160,000.
58. The increased prospect of damages creates competing incentives for attorneys. Now that
cases are worth more, employers may be more apt to spend money litigating them, which may also be
true for plaintiffs' attorneys who are more willing to invest in the cases. Alternately, the higher damage
possibility may also lead to more settlements as defendants may seek to limit their damages exposure.
See Selmi, supra note 9, at 35-37.
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Nevertheless, it does seem, for whatever reason, that there are a fair
number-how many is much harder to say-of employment discrimination cases
that should never have been filed, not only because they are weak cases factually
but also because of their extraordinarily low chance ofsuccess. Indeed, the pretextplus approach had its origin in a Seventh Circuit case that was premised on a
misunderstanding of the concept of pretext, an argument that unfortunately
prevailed at trial only to be reversed on appeal.59 These cases almost always lead
to harmful and restrictive interpretations and will almost never lead to a sustained
judgment forthe plaintiff. That said, I should also note that these cases do not appear
sufficiently numerous to explain the overall low success rates for employment cases.
IV. OVERCOMING THE BIAs

Accepting that what I have defined as judicial bias helps explain the difficulty
discrimination plaintiffs face in federal court, a question remains as to how one might
try to overcome that bias. Unconscious or subtle bias is difficult to counter under any
circumstance; indeed, Professor Amy Wax has recently argued that the difficulty
employers have in alleviating subtle discrimination within their firms justifies great
caution before deciding to impose liability for such discrimination.' There are,
however, a number of tactics employers can implement to reduce the effect ofsubtle
bias on the employment process, including instituting various monitoring devices or
affirmative action as a way to counter the bias.6' Employers might adopt affirmative
action programs as a way of overcoming the bias of their managers, and they might
also adopt various review procedures to ensure that discrimination does not seep into
the process at any stage. Yet, it is considerably more difficult to find ways to counter
the bias held by courts.
In one sense, various monitoring devices are already in place: the availability of
appellate review, the fact that appellate courts operate in panels, and the need for
courts to justify their determinations through written decisions. These judicial
practices may offer some restraint on bias, but these processes only provide limited
restraint. Most cases are not appealed; many opinions are not published and, even
when they are, judges are sufficiently adept at concealing their motives. This is one
reason the composition of courts matters. Having judges who have experienced
discrimination and understand its subtle operation is likely to influence the
decisionmaking process.6 Courts have also occasionally sought to educate themselves
59. See Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557,559 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Because the district
court confused mistake with 'pretext,' its decision may not stand.").
60. See Wax, supranote 24.
61. 1have discussed some of these issues previously. See Michael Selmi, Discriminationas
Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 Ind. L.J. 1233 (1999) (responding to Professor Wax), and
Michael Selmi, TestingforEquality:Merit,Efficiency, andthe AffirmativeAction Debate,42 UCLA
L. Rev. 1251 (1995).
62. This is obviously a broad statement for which there are many exceptions and caveats.
However, some of the more interesting decisions on the subtlety ofdiscrimination have been authored
by Timothy Lewis, a Republican African-American appointee to the Third Circuit, who seems to bring
a distinct perspective to his opinions. See, e.g., Aman v. Cort Furniture, 85 F.3d 1074, 1081-84 (3rd
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in bias with task forces that publish reports regarding gender bias in the courts.63 It is
difficult to know whether these reports have had any effect, and too often such
education projects end up preaching to the converted, given that in the area of
antidiscrimination law ideological commitments seem to hold more sway than
education or facts.
One example of how the facts seem to be largely irrelevant to influencing
opinions arises from the recent spate of record-setting class action employment
discrimination settlements. In the last five years major class action cases often
resulting in settlements worth more than $100 million have been filed and resolved
against Texaco, Denny's, Coca-Cola, Shoney's, Publix Markets, and Mitsubishi,
and yet,these cases have not been seen as an indication that discrimination remains
a problem in the labor market. It is difficult to know what other lesson to draw from
these cases. Surely the settlement amounts are too large to be considered nuisance
settlements; yet, beyond the initial press stories, these cases have largely gone
unnoticed.
This is, I think, part of a larger problem, which is that those who believe
discrimination remains firmly entrenched in the labor market have largely failed to
make a persuasive public case for their position. I must confess I am not sure why
this is, but opinion polls continue to demonstrate that whites believe African
Americans generally have an equal chance in life, and the polls likewise show a
deep chasm between the beliefs ofAfrican Americans and whites on how far the
nation has moved toward equality." One possibility, though it is little more than
that, is that the debate over affirmative action has largely displaced the debate over
the persistence and cause ofinequality in America. As Ihave noted previously, the
debate over affirmative action early diverged from a link to past and present
discrimination as the underlying justification to a focus on diversity, even though
the strongest juistification both as a matter of law and policy has always been as a
remedy for past and present discrimination. 6' During the affirmative action debate,
far too little attention has been paid to the continued persistence of discrimination
as well as to deriving new ways to remedy some ofthe disparities that continue to
define our racial divisions.
In addition to focusing too much attention on affirmative action, the
proliferation ofrights as an aspect ofidentity politics has likewise diluted the force
of discrimination claims. The reach ofboth the ADA and the ADEA extends well
beyond what our nation would likely agree warrants attention, and the judiciary has

Cir. 1996).
63. See e.g., Todd D. Peterson, Studying the Impact ofRace andEthnicityin the Federal Courts,
64 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 173 (1996).
64. See, e.g., Keith Reeves, Voting Hopes or Fears? White Voters, Black Candidates and Racial
Politics in America 4 (1997) ("[A]n overwhelming majority ofwhite Americans believe that blacks in
fact have an equal chance to succeed in life."); see generally Jennifer L. Hochschild, Facing Up to the
American Dream (1995) (discussing the many differences among whites and black on matters ofrace).
65. See Michael Selmi, The Facts ofAfirmative Action, Reviewing The Shape of the River:
Long-Term Consequences ofConsidering Race in College and University Admissions, 85 Va. L. Rev.
697, 738-39 (1999).
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largely acted to bring the statutes within more acceptable limits, even though in

their efforts the courts have invariably gone too far. It is difficult to know whether
the ADEA would be interpreted more expansively if it only applied to persons fifty
and over, or whether the Sutton line ofcases might have come out differently ifthe
ADA had been written more narrowly or concretely, but there is certainly the
prospect that narrower or more focussed statutes would have produced different
results. There may be a lesson here for legislative drafting or the influence of
interest groups. Although the interest groups were quite effective in enacting the
ADA and the ADEA-largely because of their power and the fact that these two
areas represent politically unobjectionable legislative targets--they have been far
less effective at influencing the judiciary, and their influence on the latter may have
been greater had the statutes been drawn more narrowly.
This leads to two ways in which plaintiffs might be able to countermand
judicial bias, at least to some limited extent. First, plaintiffs should present
evidence to explain the nature of the discrimination at issue, and in presenting the
evidence should generally assume the court is hostile to the claim. This may
necessitate expert testimony on the nature of unconscious or subtle discrimination,
which currently is used only rarely but which can be quite influential as a means of
providing the necessary causation to establish a claim." Even where evidence is
not available, either because of its cost or admissibility, the plaintiff's attorney can
likely explain the nature of discrimination rather than leaving the jury or the judge
to make the links. This, of course, will not always be effective, and much of the
judicial bias I have discussed is especially difficult to counter in that it is covert
rather than open, and court decorum often precludes open confrontation with a
judge, though occasionally some level of confrontation or awareness may be
necessary.
Given the problems plaintiffs face, it is also incumbent upon their attorneys to
engage in careful case selection and refrain from pursuing cases that have little
chance of success. Even where those cases succeed in the lower court, they will still
have a substantial chance ofbeing reversed on appeal, and the difficulty ofwinning
cases should also counsel in favor ofsettling cases wherever a reasonable settlement
is within reach.
Courts can also enact their own prophylatic rules as a way ofpreventing their
biases from influencing their decisionmaking process. This was why the Court's
decision in St. Mary'sHonorCenterv. Hickswas so critical. The question at issue
in Hicks was whether a finding of pretext should result in a mandatory or a
permissive inference of discrimination. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had
chosen a mandatory inference, whereas the Supreme Court held that a permissive
inference was the appropriate rule. While one can argue about which standard was

66. Expert testimony by social psychologist Susan Fiske was an essential part ofthe famous case
of Price Waterhousev. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989). More recently, testimony has
been used to document how discrimination can be decoded from events where direct evidence is
lacking. See Erin Texeira, The Subtle Clues of Racism, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 11, 2001, at A-i
(describing testimony of David Wellman).
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more or less consistent with past precedent,"' a mandatory inference was clearly the
most effective means of restraining discriminatory judicial impulses for a
permissive inference allowed the trier of fact to exercise too much
discretion-discretion that can be used to further bias-to determine whether
discrimination provided the underlying explanation for the challenged decision. But
it would take a more aware Court to impose such restrictions on thejudiciary thanwe
currently have, though it is conceivable that Reeves might tip the balance somewhat.
Yet, I believe it is not likely that Reeves will offer significant helpto plaintiffs
other than in a few isolated cases. Indeed, it appears that an unusually large number
of courts are seizing on the statement in Reeves that in some cases proof ofpretext
may not be enough to prove discrimination as in when the "'plaintiff create[s] a weak
issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there [is] abundant
and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination has occurred."'
This helps illustrate the fact that doctrine is rarely sufficiently restraining to limit the
bias ofcourts, and where the Supreme Court leaves room for discretion it invariably
leaves room for bias. The hope isthat some courts will read Reeves as reemphasizing
that once the plaintiffprovides sufficient evidence ofpretext, the ultimate question of
discrimination is then the province of the jury. But,as noted earlier, Reeves largely
reiterated the Court's decision in Hicks, which suggests that fulfilling that hope will
require more than doctrinal tinkering, it will require a greater shift in attitudes, in
particular with respect to the judiciary's beliefthat discrimination remains a persistent
part ofcontemporary life. Without such a belief,courts are likely to continue to treat
employment discrimination cases as a docket nuisance rather than as vehicles for
justice.
V. CONCLUSION

In this short essay, I hope to have demonstrated that employment discrimination

cases are unusually difficult to win, contrary to the reigning perspective, and that the
various biases courts bring to the cases deeply affect how courts analyze and decide
67. See Selmi, supra note 27, at 330 (discussing Court's past precedent). I worked on an amicus
brief in the Hicks case and in my research concluded that the Court's doctrine was, in fact, ambiguous
on the appropriate inference that should be drawn based on proof ofpretext. As the Court noted in
Hicks, the most significant case was probably the little-known and little-cited United States PostalServ.
Bd.ofGovernors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478 (1983). But what was most clear based on
the Court's precedent is that "the Court had never paid close attention to the distinction between pretext
and pretext for discrimination." Selmi, supra note 27, at 330.
68. Connell v. Consolidated Edison, No. 98 Civ. 5717 (DC), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11857, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16,2000) (quoting Reeves); Cumbow v. Exxon Corp., No. 97-2797 Section 'T'
(5), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14153 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 2000) (same); Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids,
104 F. Supp.2d 1130, 1161 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (same). See also Williams v. Dictaphone Corp., 112 F.
Supp.2d 267,281 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (suggesting Reeves did not add anything to the doctrine); Sacavage
v. Jefferson Univ. Physicians, No. 99-3870, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9917 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2000)
(finding that Reeves did not alter pretext analysis). Professor Zimmer's contribution to this symposium
presents a far more comprehensive review ofthe existing case law and explores the latest cases more
thoroughly. See Michael Zimmer, The Slicing andDicing ofIndividual Disparate Treatment Law, 61

La. L. Rev. 575 (2001).
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cases. It is, of course, somewhat ironic that in 1964 when Title VII was passed,
plaintiffs preferred bench to jury trials, but by 1991, the presumption was entirely
reversed, as courts grew increasingly hostile to employment discrimination claims.
Unfortunately, providing the right to a jury trial for all discrimination plaintiffs who
bring claims of intentional discrimination has not removed that hostility. The good
news is that some ofthe hostility can be occasionally reversed or remedied by a higher
authority, as occurred in Reeves, while the bad news is that all too much remains,
creating barriers to success that continue to render employment discrimination cases
among the most difficult of all cases to win.

